Cold War and the Fate of Ukrainian Culture

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Draft: not to be cited without the author's permission.

Introduction

On June 30, 1951, a large crowd gathered in Palermo, Ontario for a festival and concert. The occasion was the planned unveiling of a statue to Taras Shevchenko, the nineteenth century Ukrainian poet, on the 90th anniversary of his death. The statue, revealed the next day, stood on a pedestal with the words "From the Soviet Ukrainian people to the Ukrainians of Canada." A mere six years after the end of World War II, a substantial portion of Canadians remembered the Soviet-Canadian wartime alliance warmly. Moreover, the Cold War was still in its early stages. Aimed at a Ukrainian Canadian audience, this gesture of Soviet cultural diplomacy was meant to demonstrate that the Soviet Union honored the legacy of this revered literary figure (see clipping from *The Telegram in* TsDAVOVU: 5110/1/512/18–32).

Only two decades later, by the early 1970s, a similar Soviet gesture of cultural diplomacy would have been unthinkable. The image of the Soviet Union had decisively changed from wartime ally to violator of human rights, especially when it came to the national rights of its non-Russian citizens. The Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States commemorated subsequent Shevchenko anniversaries in much more anti-Soviet tones. Nevertheless, the Palermo statue demonstrated that, in the right circumstances, the Soviet Union sought to appeal to Ukrainian communities abroad, even as it expressed vitriolic criticisms of their leadership structures. Gradually, the fate of Ukrainian culture within the Soviet Union took center stage in the engagement between Soviet Ukraine and Ukrainian communities around the world.[1] Faced as they were with domestic cultural critics, the Soviet authorities found this field of battle increasingly treacherous in foreign policy.

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Cold War Historiography and the Ukrainian Dimension

The global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union known as the Cold War structured the development of world history for more than four

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[1] While this paper looks specifically at the United States and Canada, the conflict also touched communities in Argentina, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Australia.

decades. The two systems competed for moral legitimacy, political influence, and economic supremacy. During the second half of the twentieth century, few issues were left unaffected by the standoff between capitalism and communism. Its influence is indisputable, but what exactly was the Cold War? Thirty years after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, historians still debate this question.

Recent research on the Cold War, in the words of Masuda Hajimu (Hajimu: 2019), is characterized by "convergent" and "divergent" scholarship on the subject. "Convergent" scholarship conceptualizes the conflict narrowly, usually focusing it on ideological conflict centered in Europe. Scholars such as Odd Arne Westad (Westad: 2017) have produced synthetic accounts focused on superpower conflict. On the other hand, according to Hajimu, works representing the "divergent" approach expand our understanding of the Cold War thematically, focusing on cultural diplomacy, popular culture, domestic design, or other spheres not traditionally associated with hard-power geopolitical rivalry (Romero: 2014).

Where does the Ukrainian Cold War fit into this historiography? At this point, it is difficult to say. On the one hand, the purported "national liberation" of Ukrainians was an important part of one superpower's claims to domestic legitimacy, and portraying Ukrainians as a "captive nation" was important to the other superpower's critique of that legitimacy. On the other hand, an argument about the development of a minority culture seems only obliquely related to the central conflict between socialism and capitalism, which the "convergent" approach treats as definitional. Certainly, Ukrainian activism in Canada and the United States epitomized a "diasporic" engagement with a homeland (Satzewich: 2002), although activism was far from the only way diaspora populations engaged with Ukraine (Khanenko-Friesen: 2015). Nevertheless, "diaspora" by itself does not seem enough to account for the mutual influence of diaspora and Soviet Ukrainian elite.

The historiography of the Cold War, as well-developed and authoritative as it is, does have its blind spots. It tends to center on the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union. The story of the Ukrainian Cold War pushes against this tendency by focusing on an issue of immense importance to the Soviet Union and only secondary (or tertiary) interest to the United States: the legitimacy of Soviet claims of supporting Ukrainian culture.

Second, the historiography often focuses on the central decision-making institutions of the superpowers at the expense of lower levels of government, to say nothing of the experiences of ordinary people. Centering the transnational Ukrainian Cold War demonstrates that elites within the Communist Party of Ukraine exercised significant agency in carrying out Soviet foreign policy. It also reveals how Ukrainian activists in the capitalist world could instrumentalize the superpower stand-off for their own ends.

In a highly polarized global political climate connected increasingly by communications technologies, it should come as no surprise that culture mattered. For my purposes here, I define culture in rather traditional terms: the national cultural patrimony as defined by elites and embraced by broad swathes of the population. Discussing the Washington Shevchenko statue and the Russification controversy in Canada together complicates our understanding of the Cold War as two blocs facing off against one another.

The 150th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's birth, which was observed on both sides of the Iron Curtain, shows how arguments over culture and commemoration actually transcended political divides. Even if interpretations of Shevchenko diverged substantially, there was nevertheless a consensus on his importance to Ukrainian culture. On the other hand, the expulsion of John Kolasky from the Soviet Union demonstrates that culture could divide even close ideological allies. The longstanding controversy over Russification in Ukraine, which was intensified by Kolasky's publications, created a serious hurdle for Soviet relations with their ideological brethren in Canada.

The actors in my story include the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its constituent part the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), the Soviet Ukrainian governmental bureaucracy, Soviet Ukrainian writers, and the KGB. In the United States and Canada, the actors in the Ukrainian Cold War were primarily individuals, social organizations, highly motivated ethnic communities with strong emotional commitments to Ukrainian culture, as well as the pro-Communist Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (TOUK) and the League of American Ukrainians (LAU).

<u>Dueling Statues of the Legacy of Shevchenko</u>

In 1964, on the 150th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's birth and thirteen years after the Palermo statue's unveiling, the poet's reputation seemed to be growing and possibly approaching a zenith. Two planned statues of him would be built in the capitals of the world's two superpowers. The statues commemorated the same anniversary, but their portrayal of the poet could not have been more different. The Soviet side portrayed Shevchenko as a revolutionary democrat and a prophet of Ukraine's liberation under Soviet auspices. The anti-Soviet side depicted Shevchenko as a poet of national liberation and an icon of freedom.

The Washington statue was an initiative of the Ukrainian community in the U.S. The idea is commonly traced to a 1956 article in *Svoboda*, the Ukrainian-language newspaper of the Ukrainian National Association (Dragan: 1984: 58). Support for the Shevchenko statue grew quickly and Ukrainian organizations began lobbying Congress to pass a law authorizing them to build a monument in Washington. Over the summer of 1960, the bills passed the U.S. House and Senate without objection and Public Law 86-749 was signed into law by President Eisenhower.

The statue fit squarely into the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy agenda. First of all, Eisenhower was keenly interested in increasing the soft power appeal of the American system throughout the world. A statue to a Ukrainian poet could be seen as evidence of the universal applicability of the U.S.'s values of freedom. Second, it fit closely with the "Captive Nations" concept, which portrayed the world as made up of nations straining under the yoke of Communist domination. The Captive Nations resolution passed in 1959, establishing Captive Nations Week and a National Captive Nations Committee, which functioned as an advocacy group. It designated as "captive" Eastern Bloc countries, certain Soviet republics, and Asian countries like mainland China, Tibet, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Lev Dobriansky, one of the leaders of the statue campaign, summed up these points, writing in the memorial book issue for the occasion "the Shevchenko statue is a living symbol of our national determination to share the fruits of freedom with the captive nation of Ukraine and, in the universalist spirit of Shevchenko's historic message, with the peoples of all the captive nations" (Dobriansky: 2004).

Following the passage of the bill, community leaders established the Shevchenko Memorial Committee and made Harry Truman the honorary head. Since the Congressional resolution had merely allocated the land for use by the Ukrainian American community and did not fund the construction of the statue and the small park, the committee's main tasks were to raise money, hold an artistic competition for the monument's design, and to organize the commemorative events leading up to and including the monument's unveiling. Eventually the committee raised more than $400,000 for the monument, which was an enormous sum of money in 1964. The statue itself cost around $300,000 and the remaining money went into various honoraria and other administrative costs.

As one of the statue's leading boosters, *The Ukrainian Weekly* explicitly called the statue an "instrument of Cold War" in an editorial (*The Ukrainian Weekly*: 22 October 1963). Various initiatives undertaken within the Ukrainian American community included a campaign to issue a U.S. postage stamp of Taras Shevchenko as part of the "Champions of Liberty" series, which ran from 1957 to 1961. The series already featured the likes of Simon Bolivar, Lajos Kossuth, Giuseppe Garibaldi, and Mahatma Gandhi. The postage stamp was not to be, however, as the USPS discontinued the series before the Shevchenko stamp could be included.

On June 27, former President Eisenhower unveiled the statue was in front of a crowd of around 40,000. The group marched in sweltering heat, chanted "we like Ike" and sang the American and non-Soviet Ukrainian anthems as well as Shevchenko's poetry set to music. The crowd included representatives from around the United States as well as visitors from Canada, Argentina, the U.K., and Australia, among others. The Washington, D.C. statue was built in the Dupont Circle neighborhood, on P Street between 22nd and 23rd Streets in the Northwest quadrant of the city. It was fairly close to the downtown core of the

city and also within a long walk of the Soviet Embassy. The Johnson administration, pursuing a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, sent a token representative, somewhat distancing the American government from the monument.

The statue in Moscow was unveiled two and a half weeks earlier on June 10 with the attendance of Khrushchev and a large delegation from the Ukrainian SSR, including its first secretary Petro Shelest. The statue unveiling was preceded by major commemorations in May and June of 1964. These commemorations were a major national festival celebrated at all levels of Soviet Ukrainian society and by Khrushchev himself at Shevchenko's grave in Kaniv. Planning for this anniversary observance was organized in Kÿiv by the Ukrainian Central Committee, which established its own Shevchenko committee made up of leading state officials as well as cultural and artistic figures.

The Moscow Shevchenko statue was built on the embankment of the Moscow River on the Western half of downtown, near the bridge at the end of Kutuzovskii Prospekt. The statue is situated on a small green near the Hotel Ukraina with a view of the Russian White House, which is across the river. The inscription on the monument quoted Shevchenko's verse "In the grew family, new and free, don't forget to remember me with a quiet word,'" a popular Soviet citation that interpreted the "family" as the Soviet Union.

Why did the Soviet Union build this statue to a Ukrainian poet in Moscow when it did? The Ukrainian émigré press hinted that the announcement of the American Shevchenko statue project shamed the Soviets into building a statue in their own capital. From what I can tell, the archival record bears that out. Plans for the Shevchenko statue in Moscow came together only after Congress approved the Washington statue. In January 1962, Mykola Pidhornyi wrote to the CPSU Central Committee asking them to discuss the creation of a Shevchenko statue in Moscow. He noted that not only had Lenin favored such an idea, but the "bourgeois nationalists" in Canada and the U.S. were planning to use Shevchenko's 150th anniversary in pursuit of their "hostile, anti-Soviet goals" (TsDAHOU: 1/24/5480/31). Clearly, Pidhornyi felt that this challenge to the Ukrainian SSR could not go unanswered.

Soviet Bureaucracy Looks at the Statue Campaign

Soviet Ukrainian authorities were well aware that the American Congress had authorized the creation of a Shevchenko statue in Washington from the very first days. The Central Committee received steady reports on the situation in the U.S. from the republic's delegation to the United Nations as well as from the KGB.

Reports about the diaspora's activism arrived at the Ukrainian Central Committee throughout 1963. In February, the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Luka Palamarchuk informed the Central Committee that the statue

campaign had received final approvals from local authorities to be built on P Street between 22nd and 23rd Streets in Washington (TsDAHOU: 1/31/2144/6). In July, reports arrived about the organizational and lecture activities of Ukrainian intellectuals in Chicago, New York, Passaic, as well as Toronto, London, the Netherlands, and Germany (TsDAHOU: 1/31/2144/71–76).

In November, the head of cadre selection for foreign travel Peresadenko wrote and submitted a lengthy overview of Ukrainian American publications about Shevchenko, which he claimed indignantly, were presenting the poet as "their ideologist." First, they were distorting his artistic development and ignoring the influence of Shevchenko's Petersburg period on his creativity; second, they were distorting his ideas because they didn't fit into "the procrustean bed of their anti-Soviet propaganda; third, they pretend he is an "ideologist of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism;" and finally, they falsely associated a "deep religiosity" with Shevchenko (TsDAHOU: 1/31/2144/18–31). This brief on the nationalists' falsifications ended with a recommendation that it be shared widely within the Soviet Ukrainian elite in order to more effectively counter the nationalist propaganda.

The Ukrainian Canadian communists, for their part, were also well aware of the upcoming Shevchenko anniversary. In a December 1962 conversation with the Soviet Ambassador to Canada, the general secretary of TOUK mentioned the planned statue in Washington and asked for Soviet assistance in their own plans to observe the anniversary (TsDAHOU: 1/24/5743/31–36). The Ukrainian party and state mobilized resources and eventually sent out an enormous amount of printed materials on Shevchenko's life to their embassies around the world and to those ethnic associations friendly to them, such as TOUK and the League of American Ukrainians. There were discussions in the Ukrainian Central Committee, for example, about sending an exhibition on Shevchenko's life to the LAU in New York, which would form the basis for a future Shevchenko museum (TsDAHOU: 1/24/5743/2–3; TsDAHOU: 1/24/5743/15–27).

Soviet Active Measures

The Ukrainian authorities were keenly aware of the anti-Soviet goals of the Washington Shevchenko campaign. And yet, the Soviet Union did not keep its distance from the monument project. They intervened in the Ukrainian American statue campaign in many ways, with the KGB forwarding an action plan to the Central Committee in December 1963. In addition to points about distributing Shevchenko pictures, pamphlets, and exhibitions to "progressive Ukrainian associations" around the world, they even planned to have the Ministry of Communications distribute specially issued anniversary-themed stationery and postage stamps to Western Ukraine so that those with relatives abroad would receive Shevchenko-themed correspondence (TsDAHOU: 1/24/5774/7–12).

One of the most prominent initiatives was to co-opt Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals to write an open letter to the diaspora, calling on then to allow Soviet participation in the statue unveiling. In this way, they sought to drive a wedge within the diaspora between those who were open to engaging with the Soviet Union and those who viewed Soviet involvement in the Shevchenko campaign with suspicion.

The letter was first drafted in the Ukrainian Central Committee in the summer of 1963. Shelest wrote to Moscow, saying that the letter would serve to "expose the dirty anti-Soviet campaign, which is being led by the ringleaders of Ukrainian nationalist organizations and certain reactionary circles in the U.S." If the popular response to the letter was favorable, this set of circumstances could be used to "neutralize the anti-Soviet campaign" (RGANI: 5/55/49/218). First secretary Petro Shelest forwarded the letter to Moscow on August 24 and it was approved for publication with minor edits (RGANI: 5/55/49/227–234).

The Soviet Ukrainian authorities could also take advantage of unplanned circumstances to push their goals of dividing the émigrés and blunting the message of the nationalists. One such example involved utilizing personal channels established by the Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad. The vector for this other major intervention turned out to be someone closely connected to the Shevchenko Campaign Committee: its treasurer Platon Stasiuk.

Stasiuk was a businessman who lived in the New York City area and was fairly well-known within the community. According to his memoir, he and his wife went to Ukraine in August 1961 and while he was there he was inspired to bring soil from Shevchenko's grave site in Kaniv, several hours south of Kyiv (Stasiuk: 1963: 5). He ran into obstacles doing this on his own because his visa application did not list Kaniv as a planned destination and so he was not allowed to secure transportation.

Again, according to Stasiuk's own version of events, at this point he met up by chance with a Ukrainian poet he knew named Mykola Tarnovsky, who had lived for a time in the United States but had re-emigrated back to Soviet Ukraine. Tarnovsky took Stasiuk to see his boss at the Association for Cultural Ties with Ukrainians Abroad and this organization arranged for Stasiuk and his wife to be chauffeured to Kaniv along with a photographer who would document the transfer of the soil (Stasiuk: 1963: 7–8).

Stasiuk returned, soil in hand, and passed the materials over to the Committee, which initially showed interest in the soil, but later turned against the idea and avoided the topic once it was clear that the Soviet press was going to make political hay over the issue. Stasiuk took umbrage at his treatment by the committee, resigned his post, and published a memoir of his experience (to be later supplemented by a second account of his return of the soil to the Soviet Union) (Stasiuk: 1963; Stasiuk: 1965).

During the contretemps over the soil from Shevchenko's grave, the KGB and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine discussed how to utilize the story of Stasiuk's ill-fated idea to take soil. The head of the KGB Nikitchenko sent a report to the Central Committee in January 1964 reporting approvingly on Statsiuk's book and proposing to reprint it in *Visti z Ukraïny* alongside an editorial explaining their decision to do so (TsDAHOU: 1/16/173/1–8).

Another fact pointing to the KGB's intense interest in the Stasiuk situation was the involvement of the Association for Cultural Ties with Ukrainians Abroad, which was headed at the time by Yuri Smolych, a well-known Ukrainian writer and journalist. The organization worked very closely with the KGB and the Central Committee of the CPU to supervise all interactions between Soviet Ukrainians and foreigners and to carry out various propaganda initiatives, including exchange programs and publishing the newspaper *Visti z Ukraïny* and its English-language counterpart *News from Ukraine*. It used the latter newspaper to try to influence émigré communities in the West and around the world by showing developments in Soviet Ukraine in the most positive light possible.

From the archival record that I have been able to review, it is unclear if Stasiuk's original mission was his own initiative or whether he was a witting Soviet agent. However, for the purposes of promoting Soviet influence, the question is not really all that important. The message that was sent via the Ukrainian authorities' amplification of Stasiuk's outraged pamphlet was that the Soviet Union was open to cooperation with the Ukrainian American community, but the latter's rejection of the soil ruined this opportunity.

The Shevchenko statues may have represented the high point of superpower interest in Shevchenko, particularly on the American side, which even then embraced Shevchenko with some hesitation. Ultimately, the parallel creation of Shevchenko statues in the two Cold War superpowers' capital cities is an episode in what I am calling the Ukrainian Cold War. This ideological competition focused not only on opposed economic and political systems, but also on questions of culture. Culture was a stand-in for each side's diametrically opposed answers to the question of whether Ukraine had any sovereignty within the Soviet Union.

On one side were was the Soviet Union, in which responsibility lay with the Ukrainian SSR and its constituent ideological and foreign policy bureaucracies. On the other side, were the numerically small but politically influential Ukrainian organizations in the United States and Canada, which argued that national liberation for Ukraine should be added to the list of Cold War desiderata. This aspiration was premised on the position that Ukrainian statehood within the USSR was a fig leaf that masked national oppression.

The Russification Controversy among Pro-Communist Canadians in the 1960s

Within a couple of years of the Shevchenko anniversary, an entirely different set of circumstances produced another affair that revolved around Ukrainian language and culture. This time, rather than anti-Communist Ukrainian Americans, it involved progressive Ukrainian Canadians. Compared with the United States, Canada's Ukrainian communities had a proportionally larger and more vocal pro-Communist minority that was based on labor organizing among first-wave Ukrainian immigrants to Canada.

The Communist Party of Canada (CPC) maintained a relatively small base of dedicated party workers. However, the CPC maintained influence beyond the party through a set of ethnic mass associations that had broader memberships, including those for Ukrainians, Finns, and Poles. The CPC maintained relations with the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (TOUK), which had chapters across Canada.

Members of TOUK engaged in labor organizing and cultural programming, defended the Soviet Union publicly, and promoted Soviet claims of fostering Ukrainian culture and developing the Ukrainian economy. The Soviet Union treated members of TOUK with solicitude, allowing its diplomats to meet with them, inviting members to visit the Soviet Union, and even accepted some of its younger members to study in the Soviet Union.

In 1963 a young Ukrainian Canadian teacher named John Kolasky traveled to the Soviet Union, along with a group of other students, for two years of study in Ukraine. He was older than many of the other students and had already worked in Canada as a teacher. He suggested, in retrospect, that one of his goals in going to Ukraine, in addition to what he would learn, was to help the Soviet authorities better reach out to the Ukrainian community of Canada and win the latter over to the Soviet cause (Kolasky: 1970: 2).

While in Kyiv, Kolasky collected documents, spoke with officials, and befriended numerous representatives of the Ukrainian people, including influential members of the artistic and literary elites. For example, the poet Andrii Malyshko reportedly gave Kolasky several unpublished poems written by the late Volodymy Sosiura, a KGB report noted (HDA SBU: 16/1/951/385).

As he got to know life in Soviet Ukraine better, Kolasky became increasingly concerned about the place of the Ukrainian language and culture in people's everyday life. Among extensive quotations from his conversations, for example, the KGB recorded the following statement it attributed to Kolasky: "When I arrived in Kyiv—the first one and a half to two months I walked around as if poisoned: nowhere in the capital of Ukraine can one hear Ukrainian!" (HDA SBU: 16/1/950/75). He also collected evidence that backed up his claims of Russian domination, including information on the ethnic background of party

bureaucrats, which he claimed demonstrated that Russians were favored within the social and political hierarchy in Ukraine. The KGB found that Kolasky had been collecting information on high-ranking party officials that he called "Russifiers"—including Andrii Skaba, Yuri Kondufor, Ivan Bilodid, and Mykola Shamota—and hoped that publishing this information in the West could lead to their removal (HDA SBU: 16/1/951/268–269).

Interestingly, Kolasky was present in Kyiv during the commemoration of the 150th anniversary of Shevchenko's birth in the spring and summer of 1964. His recollections make it clear that by that point he already harbored deep doubts about the veracity of Soviet claims about Ukrainian culture. While attending a Shevchenko commemoration, he recalls the electrified audience response to a Georgian speaker who began his remarks in Ukrainian and the horrified and chauvinistic reactions of the Russians sitting to either side of him (Kolasky: 1970: 195–197).

Toward the end of Kolasky's two-year stint in Ukraine, the KGB moved to expel him. The secret police had been surveiling him, investigating his contacts with Soviet citizens, and monitoring his mail. Kolasky recounts being detained for several days of questioning, starting on July 29, 1965, but then being released to return to Canada (Kolasky: 1970: 229–239). He began working on a book that would eventually become *Education in Soviet Ukraine* (Kolasky: 1968).

Back in Canada, concern about Russification had been growing among pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadians. Partially to placate the Ukrainian ethnic association, the Communist Party of Canada sent a delegation headed by Tim Buck to investigate the question of Russification in March–April 1967. They met with high-ranking members of the CPSU, including Mikhail Suslov and then traveled to Ukraine to observe conditions for themselves. They then returned to Canada, wrote a report and adopted it at a CPC plenum in September. Finally, the report was published in the party's ideological journal *Viewpoint* in its December 1967 issue.

Needless to say, the Ukrainian sections of the Communist Party were paying attention. A February 1968 report from Skaba in Kyiv to the Central Committee in Moscow noted approvingly that, upon departure from Ukraine, Tim Buck had written: "Our report to the Canadians will help alter those false perceptions that millions of them have about conditions of life in Ukraine and the direction of the development of its economy and culture" (RGANI: 5/60/413/2). Nevertheless, the Skaba continued, the visit had not resolved all the doubts of delegation members and now their report was being discussed in the nationalist press in "an uncomfortable manner for us" (RGANI: 5/60/413/5). And moreover, the report noted forebodingly, the progressive organizations in Canada must have known that Kolasky was preparing a book about Russification and were doing nothing about it (RGANI: 5/60/413/6).

In a March 1968 report to the Central Committee, the Soviet Ambassador to Canada Ivan Shped'ko reported on what he called an anti-Soviet campaign based on the CPC delegation's report published in *Viewpoint* as well as Kolasky's *Education in Soviet Ukraine* (TsDAHOU: 1/25/106/73–76). It also noted that the campaign had taken on broad character and was not being counteracted effectively by either the CPC or TOUK (TsDAHOU: 1/25/106/76).

Pressure was applied and the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians reaffirmed its loyalty to the Soviet Union at a meeting in April 1968 (Kolasky: 1979: 169). Tensions were not eased entirely, however, as even at that meeting Peter Krawchuk criticized the Soviet authorities for their refusal to allow them to visit relatives in Ukraine and the group approved a letter to Mykola Pidhornyi, (by then the head of the Soviet state) and Demian Korotchenko, head of state of the Ukrainian SSR, demanding this right (Kolasky: 1979: 172).

Kolasky's book *Education in Soviet Ukraine* (1968) had indeed received favorable coverage in more nationalistic press outlets such as *The Ukrainian Weekly*, which ran two favorable book reviews and an editorial calling attention to both Kolasky's indictment and the *Viewpoint* article. In September 1968, Dmytro Bilokolos, the foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR, forwarded proposals for engaging the Ukrainian emigration. These proposals confirmed the assumption underlying policy toward the diaspora: that the people could be separated from the "nationalist" leadership (TsDAHOU: 1/25/106/184–191).

The Soviet authorities spared no effort in pressuring the CPC to renounce the resolution, including inviting a second delegation to the Soviet Union and raising the matter repeatedly in meetings with Bill Kashtan, the general secretary of the CPC. Kolasky was indicted and expelled from the CPC in June 1968, a fact that was duly relayed to Kyiv by the Canadian embassy in Ottawa (TsDAHOU: 1/25/106/167–169). Finally, in October 1969, the Communist Party of Canada withdrew their resolution critical of Russification in the USSR at a plenum (Kolasky: 1979: 171).

For his part, Kolasky continued to write about the topic of Russification in Soviet Ukraine. In 1970, he published a memoir titled *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine. A Canadian's Personal Account of Russian Oppression and the Growing Opposition*. The personal shock of the reality of life in Ukraine had clearly affected him deeply and forced a political re-orientation. In 1979, he published a critical history of the Ukrainian Canadian Pro-Communist movement, which centered on TOUK. In the late 1980s, he became an advisor to Ukraine's rising independence movement.

He was not alone among Ukrainian Canadian Communists in his disillusionment and disappointment. According to his history, doubts about Soviet cultural policies in Ukraine were already present among pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadians in the early 1960s (Kolasky: 1979: 161–163). And what is more, the pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadians were aware that they were already in an

unenviable position vis-à-vis the nationalists. For example, the Soviet Ambassador characterized TOUK general secretary Peter Prokopchak's anxieties about the society's "aging membership," as compared to the nationalists' emphasis on working with the young, including opening up a Ukrainian high school, promoting Ukrainian language classes in Ontario schools, and discussing the creation of a Ukrainian university. What is more, the nationalists outnumbered members of TOUK, had more money, and benefitted from the institutional support of the churches (TsDAHOU: 1/24/5743/31–32).

The controversy over Russification that erupted in the mid-1960s among left-wing Ukrainian groups in Canada demonstrates that the Ukrainian question could cut another way for the Soviet Union. Critiques of their policies could also come not simply from their ideological competitors, but from their sympathizers.

By the early 1970s, the idea that the Soviet Union was engaging in Russification of the Ukrainian republic became an article of faith in the Ukrainian communities of Canada and the United States. A 1974 CPU report pointed out that the overwhelming focus of nationalist critique was the "national factor" in USSR and identified the "myth of Russification" as the most common theme in nationalist propaganda (TsDAHOU: 1/25/1125/9–16). What it did not mention was the fuel that left-wing Ukrainian Canadians like Kolasky had added to the fire. Given the paucity of reliable information about life in the Soviet Union, Kolasky's publications and speeches on the subject were all the more convincing. Reports about the repression of dissenting intellectuals in the late 1960s and early 1970s only provided additional evidence to back up his allegations of a system deeply hostile to Ukrainian culture.

The Cold War and the Fate of Ukrainian Culture

The Shevchenko campaign in the United States came out of the context of the late 1950s and was shaped mainly by traditional notions of respect for Ukrainian culture. It centered on a cultural figure revered on both sides of the Iron Curtain and involved the construction of competing statues in the global capitals of Washington, D.C. and Moscow. Interpretations of Shevchenko differed widely, to be sure, but perhaps ironically there was agreement on his importance and the appropriate means to honor his memory. Soviet gestures and attempts to influence the Washington Shevchenko campaign were largely rebuffed, but for their domestic audience and their sympathizers abroad, the authorities' investment of resources in the Shevchenko cult was unquestionable.

On the other hand, the Russification controversies that roiled the CPC and pro-Communist Ukrainian Canadians in the 1960s focused on something much more difficult for the Soviet Union to falsify: everyday language usage in Ukraine. The standards to which the Soviet Union was held by its Ukrainian Canadian sympathizers went beyond the traditional and well-worn development of the Shevchenko cult to everyday life in their homeland. Centered around these

questions and supported by proliferating first-hand accounts, the allegations of Russification posed a complicated problem for Ukrainian state authorities. The political context of the late 1960s and early 1970s was incomparably more challenging for Soviet interests. Concerns about the Ukrainian party leadership's ability to handle dissenting intellectuals and foreign critics of the Ukrainian SSR led to an enormous reshuffling of cadres after the ouster of Petro Shelest as first secretary of the Ukrainian party in 1972.

To return to the questions raised in the introduction, how are we to understand the Ukrainian Cold War in light of the Washington Shevchenko statue and the controversy over Russification in the Soviet Union? Was the Ukrainian SSR doing battle with its antagonists in the emigration as part of the global rivalry between socialism and capitalism? Or did each side's arguments, instead, turn on the fate of Ukrainian culture? Does studying this conflict help us understand the central confrontation between communism or capitalism (i.e. a convergent scholarly contribution), or does this force us to expand our understanding of the Cold War (divergent)?

These two episodes from the Cold War are part of a much older argument about the place of Ukrainian culture in states dominated by others that dates back at least to the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the Cold War context is crucial to understanding them. Were we to take socialism and capitalism not simply as economic modes of production, but as representing civilizational choices that come with their own set of policies toward diversity, then we would have to acknowledge that the disputes over Ukrainian culture in the 1960s were at the center of a global Cold War, even if it was a comparatively minor theater of that confrontation. On the other hand, given that the antagonists on either side were not quite states, one can understand that the Ukrainian Cold War also pushes the boundaries of traditional accounts of the Cold War focused on international relations by returning agency to sub-state actors on both sides.

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